## 

DP IMMED
DE WTE #3944 1682105
D 172030Z JUN 74
FM THE SITUATION ROOM //TOPRESO06//

TO LES JANKA FOR GEN. SCOWCROFT (AMMAN)

UNCLAS WH41984

TOPRESO06

JUNE 17, 1974

TO: LE

LES JANKA WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY PETER RODHAN WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

KATHLEEN TROTA

FOLLOWING IS AN EXCERPT FROM SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT 11200 A.M. TODAY (JUNE 17) 1974). LEW THOMPSON WANTED THIS PASSED ON IMMEDIATELY FOR YOUR INFORMATION. FULL TEXT TO FOLLOW WHEN AVAILABLE.

## BEGIN TEXT:

Q: MR. SECRETARY, A COUPLE DE MONTHS AGO HE HAD SECRETARY KISSINGER TELLING US PRETTY CLEARLY THAT THE CHANCES FOR A SALT AGREEMENT ON OFFENSIVE HEAPONS HAS ALMOST OUT OF THE QUESTION. WE'VE HAD A SERIES OF REPORTS OUT OF NEGOTIATORS THE SOVIETS ARE HOLDING VERY TOUGH FOR A SIMPLE EXTENSION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. NOW, HERE A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT GOES TO THE SOVIET UNION HE'RE TALKING ABOUT CHANCES OF AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IN A VERY SIGNIFICANT AREA OF MIRV TECHNOLOGY. HOW CAN YOU ASSURE US THAT THIS IS NOT IMPEACHMENT POLITICS THE PRESIDENT DESPERATELY TRYING TO GET SOMETHING OUT OF SALT SO AS TO STRENGTHEN HIS HAND HERE IN CONGRESS AND WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?

AT I DON'T THINK THAT THE KIND OF ACTIONS THAT YOU DESCRIBE WOULD INDEED STRENGTHEN HIS HAND. I WOULD GO BACK TO WHAT I SAID EARLIER ABOUT THE PRESIDENT, THAT IN MY JUDGEMENT PRESIDENT NIXON HOULD DO NOTHING INTENTIONALLY THAT WOULD DAMAGE THE NATIONAL SECURITY. I RECONGRIZE THAT THERE ARE DUR DOMESTIC TURNOTED,

的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事例HSR(COMMENT)。由的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事的事

KENNEDY, MCFARLANE, TROLA, SECFLE

PSN:021256

RECALLED PAGE 01

TOR: 168/20:54Z

DTG: 172030Z JUN 74

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* N. C. L. A. S. S. I. F. I. E. D\*\*\*\*\*\*\* COPY

## 

BUT I THINK THAT EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IS A VISCERAL, INSTINCTIVE PATRIOT AND HIS ENTIRE HISTORY BEARS WITHESS TO THAT INSTINCTIVE PATRIOTISM. HE HAS NOT CHANGED IN THAT REGARD. AS I DESERVED EARLIER, DNE SHOULD WAIT FOR THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING BEFORE ONE LEAPS TO ANY CONCLUSIONS.

Q: MAY I FOLLOW UP ON THAT STATEMENT? YOU SAID I DON'T THINK THAT THE KIND OF ACTIONS YOU DESCRIBE WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND. I TAKE IT YOU HOLD TO THE VIEW THAT ONLY BY TAKING A HARD LINE IN MOSCOW WOULD HELP THE PRESIDENT INSOFAR AS IMPEACHMENT POLITICS ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE THIS WOULD PLEASE THE CONSERVATIVES ON CAPITOL HILL?

A: NO, THAT WAS NOT MY INTENTION. I THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE BACKED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN ANY REASONABLE AGREEMENT. WHAT I INFERRED FROM THE PRIOR QUESTION WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE BRESIDENT IN PURSUIT OF AN AGREEMENT MIGHT ACCEPT AN UNREASONABLE AGREEMENT. I DON'T THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ANY INTENTION OF DOING SO IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND IN THE SECOND PLACE, THAT THAT WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL TO HIM.

Q: BECAUSE OF THE CONSERVATIVES ON CAPITOL HILL?

AT I THINK THAT IT SHOULD BE PUT IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL JUDGMENT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PROGRESS IN MAINTAINING RELAXED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BUT THEY WANT TO BE SURE THAT THERE IS A BALANCE IN THOSE RELATIONSHIPS AND I THINK THAT THE PRESIDENT STRONGLY SUPPORTS THAT POSITION.

END TEXT

WARM REGARDS.

PSN: 021256

RECALLED

DTG:172030Z JUN 74

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*\*\* COPY